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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
D. KENT WRIGHT, GERALD A.
VAN MONDFRANS, PHILLIP K.
EVANS, and HUGH J. HINTZE,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
KENNETH D. LAWSON, RAY M.
UNRATH, LEONARD F. ZALLER,
JAMES E. MITCHELL, and MICHAEL STECHLEY,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
13719

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This action is brought by Plaintiffs who are Directors
of the Utah Corporation known as Com Tel, Inc. against
the Defendants each of who claimf to be stockholders in
Com Tel, Inc. Two of the Defendants, Kenneth D. Lawson and Ray M. Unrath, were at one time Directors of
Com Tel, Inc., but not at the time of this incident. On
the 25th day of September, 1973, letter sponsored by the
Defendants was published libelling the Plaintiffs.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After the Action was filed and before the Defendants answered, a Motion for Summary Judgment was
filed and argued before the Lower Court, That Court
granted summary judgment against the Plaintiffs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the judgment of the
Lower Court remanding the case for trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Some background data is necessary in order that
the issue in this case be properly set forth.
Com Tel, Inc., a Utah corporation, was organized in
June, 1969, by Plaintiffs D. Kent Wright, Gerald A. Van
Mondfrans, and Phillip K. Evans. Each of the above
has educational backgrounds and training in the electron field and in the field of business management and
contracts administration. Mr. Hugh J. Hintze, a member
of the Bar of this state, joined this group as a Director
during the course of a public offering of its capital common stock. The company successfully pursued its business affairs in the electronics field continuously after
its formation in 1969.
In the fall of 1971, Com Tel became acquainted with
a company known as Marketing Systems, Inc. (MSI Television). The Defendants in this action were each officers and/or directors of that corporation. A seeming
community of interest appeared between these two comDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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panies and an acquisition agreement effective January
10,1972, was negotiated. Defendants Kenneth D. Lawson
and Ray M. Unrath eventually became officers and directors of Com Tel, Inc. Marketing Systems, Inc., was
continued as a wholly owned subsidiary of Com Tel, Inc.
After a period of approximately fifteen (15) months
had lapsed, Defendants Lawson and Unrath became
dissatisfied with the arrangement they had made with
Com Tel and by August, 1973, both had resigned their
positions as officers and directors of Com Tel. They
continued to be stockholders, however.
On August 30, 1973, Defendants filed an Action
against the present Plaintiffs and Com Tel, Inc., in the
United States District Court for the District of Utah
alleging numerous violations of the Acquisition Agreement, (R. 13-28), and fraudulent violations of the United
States and the State of Utah Security Acts. Plaintiffs
claimed $2.5 million in damages.
On September 10,1973, Com Tel, Inc., held its annual
meeting of stockholders. This meeting was held at the
corporate plant and conducted under the direction and
authority of the four plaintiffs herein. Two of the defendants, Kenneth Lawson and Ray Unrath, attended
the meeting and were accompanied by two of their attorneys. The evidence of Plaintiffs, had this action been
allowed to go to trial, would be that the conduct of the
defendants was disruptive and devisive and purposefully
designed to afford defendants an opportunity to oust the
management of Com Tel and to place themselves in manDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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agement positions to the detriment of the numerous
small stockholders of Com Tel, Inc. Sensing this danger,
the stockholders properly adjourned the meeting sine
die.
On September 25, 1973, ten (10) days after the annual meeting, the defendants in thi saction, through their
counsel, published the defamatory matter (R. 4 through
10). The entire letter is libelous in its direct and implied
assertions but, in particular, defendants are accused of
flagrant legal violations and immoral conduct in connection with the Com Tel, Inc. annual meeting. Clearly
this is libelous per se.
Significantly, the letter demands that action be taken
within five (5) days of the receipt of the letter and indicates that if the demand is not complied with, all appropriate legal relief wiU be sought. The defendants are
unaware of any "legal relief" being sought by the defendants and certainly defendants have not at this date filed
a lawsuit concerning the matters discussed in the letter.
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in the District Court
of Salt Lake County, March 19, 1974 (R, 1). On April
26, 1974, Defendants Lawson and Unrath appeared in the
action by filing a Motion for Summary judgment (R.
45).
The matter was argued before the District Court
on May 9, 1974 (R. 51).
There was a formal Order filed (R. 51 and 55) which
does not reflect the basis of the ruling of the Court. It
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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will not be disputed, however, that the basis of the ruling
of the Court was that the letter, although libelous, was
absolutely privileged.
This case presents the unique opportunity for this
Court to clarify and redefine the limits of privilege to
libel made outside the course of judicial proceedings.
It is the belief of Plaintiffs that the proper resolution
of the issues of this case will result in a reversal of the
Summary Judgment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS.
Where Summary Judgment has been granted the
reviewing Court must canvass all of the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of the losing party
in order to determine whether summary procedures were
appropriate. We would conclude therefore that this
Court must hold that the letter of September 25, 1973
was libelous; that it was published; and that it was written under the authority and direction of the defendants.
This leaves the remaining question in this case and
that is whether the letter was privileged. This was the
approach taken by defendants in the lower court and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the Summary Judgment granted by the Trial Court was
based upon that premise only.
The Utah Court has had occasion to treat with this
problem in at least two cases. The case of Beezley v.
Hansen, 286 Pacific 2nd 1057, 4 Utah 2nd 64, involved
a libel suit between two attorneys and the action arose
during the pendency of a divorce action of the appellant
William L. Beezley. Defendant Hansen uttered certain remarks concerning the honesty of statements made
by Plaintiff Beezley in his presence and in the presence
of his daughter who was Beezley's estranged wife. Later
in a deposition of Hansen, the same remarks were made.
The Court held as follows:
"Since it appears from the pleadings and affidavits that the relationship of attorney and client existed at the time the allegedly slanderous
words were published in the presence of only the
attorney and his client and pertained to the suit,
such publication was absolutely privileged and
the Court did not err in granting the Summary
Judgment."
The later case of Western States Title Insurance
Company v. Warnock, 415 Pacific 2nd 316, 18 Utah 2nd
70, involved a claim that a letter written by the defendant Warnock and using the term Slander of Title Suit
and a statement made only to opposing counsel in the
lawsuit that "Western States Title Insurance Company
has violated its fiduciary responsibility to them" were
actionable wrongs.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Court held that the term "slander of title" was
not actionable absent proof of special damage and in
addition found that statements made by one counsel to
another during the course of litigation were matters of
free and honest communication essential to the judicial
process and therefore privileged. Although the Court
did not use the term "privileged" that is the effect of the
Ruling.
The question is immediately asked as to why this
case now under Appeal is any different from the two
Utah cases cited above. We shall see that the basic and
distinguishing factors are that in each of the Utah cases
cited, litigation was pending and the libelous or slanderous statements were made as part of and totally within
the context and issues of the pending litigation. In this
case there is no litigation.
It is true that a lawsuit had been filed by the defendants in the Federal Court alleging a breach of contract
in violation of the state and federal securities laws arising
out of an agreement of acquisition that had been entered
into in June of 1972, but the libelous statements in the
letter of September 10, 1973 are in no way connected
with that lawsuit and pertain explicitly to allegations of
wrongdoing of plaintiffs in the conduct of the annual
Com Tel stockholders' meeting held Setember 10, 1973.
The question then is whether the doctrine of privilege should be extended to situations where there is litigation pending between the parties, but which involves
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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separately distinct issues. The answer is no and the reason for this is the potention for abuse of the privilege.
Let us illustrate: Assume that an automobile dealership
is sued by a customer because of a dispute over a repair
bill. Further, that the lawyer representing the customer
acting pursuant to the directions of his client during the
course of litigation, wrongfully accuses the dealership of
dishonest dealings in connection with its sales of used
cars. It is easy to see that if these statements were
deemed privileged, that would put a tremendous weapon
in the hands of litigants. Another example would be
where a merchant sued a customer over an account and
during the pendency of those proceedings, the customer's
employer was advised either by the merchant or his attorney that merchandise had been stolen from the store
by the customer. Each of the examples we give demonstrates a situation where the defamatory statements are
made amcerning matters totally outside of the scope of
pending litigation.
Implicit in the two Utah cases cited above is the
fundamental legal principle that in order to invoke the
cloak of absolute privilege, the defamatory statements
must bear a direct relationship to the issues in the pending litigation.
We commend to the Court those cases collected in
38 A. L. R. 3rd 272. These cases deal with defamatory
matters contained in pleadings and show the well-established principle that defamatory matter is not privileged
even in a pleading unless it is pertinent to the issues inDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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volved in the case. We quote an example from the annotation:
"In Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Thomas, (1897,
C. A. 9 Wash.), 83 F. 803, (applying Washington
law), an insurance company, in its answer to an
action brought against it by the beneficiary under a policy, denied the death of the insured
and alleged as an affirmative defense that the
beneficiary and her attorneysc had entered into
an agreement to defruad the company; that such
beneficiary and her attorneys had no knowledge
or information of the death of the insured; and
that they had alleged that the insured was dead
for the sale purpose of carrying out the conspiracy. A libel suit was instituted by one of
the attorneys against whom these charges had
been made. The court, in holding that the matter alleged by the company in its answer was not
relevant and not privileged, said that the issue
in the action was whether or not the insurance
company was liable upon the policy, and that the
company's defense was that the insured was still
living, but that instead of relying upon that defense, it attempted to asperse the character of
the attorneys who were conducting the suit by
charging them with libelous matter which, if
true, added in no way to the force of its allegation that the event upon which alone its liability
was to attach had not occured, namely, the
death of the insured."
These cases apply with even greater effect here because in this case we are not dealing with a pleading, but
rather a letter which is even further removed from the
cloak of immunity.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Legislature has spoken on the subject in Title
45-2-3, U. C. A. 1953:
U

A privileged publication which shall not be considered as libelous per se is one made . . . (2)
in any publication of or any statement made in
any legislative or judicial proceeding, or in any
other official proceeding authorized by law."
This statute must be strictly construed and must
obviously mean that a privilege attains only in or during
the course of a judicial proceeding and that a privilege
cannot possibly extend to a letter whidi merely mentions
a legal proceeding and where the libelous material has
no relationship whatever to the issues in that pending
legal proceeding.
The Summary Judgment granted by the Lower
Court is silent as to the Court's reasoning. We have
already discussed one possible basis for the reasoning
of the Court and have shown it to be fallacious. The
only other possible argument that can be made in support of the judgment of the Lower Court is that the libelous letter contains some references to some legal proceeding to be commenced in the future and therefore the
letter is immune. The only language in the letter that
points in this direction is as follows:
"In the event we are not notified within five
(5) days from the receipt of this letter of a satisfactory plan of management of Com Tel to
accomplish the foregoing demands, we shall have
no alternative but to seek all the appropriate
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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legal relief with respect to accomplishing the
same."
This statement in the letter implies that at some
future time something of a legal nature would be done
in the event Com Tel failed to comply with the demand.
We are not advised as to what is meant by "legal relief"
— Does it mean a lawsuit? Does it mean application to
an administrative agency? Letters to stockholders? Who
are the parties? Are they the individual directors or
Com Tel, Inc. or a combination of both? It must be concluded that language so general in character means very
little. We can say that it does not appear that a lawsuit
was contemplated because none has ever been commenced.
The question finally comes down to whether an attorney or a party through an attorney can publish a libel
and escape the consequences thereof if there is mentioned
in connection with the libel something about "legal relief"
being sought. If this Court chooses to extend the doctrine
of privilege that far, another legal weapon is forged for
the unscrupulous. Assume that a merchant contacts his
lawyer and tells him to write a letter to someone who has
given him a check that for some reason or another was
returned to the merchant on presentment. He is advised
to tell the person in the letter that he is a bad check
artist and that the money plus attorney's fees must be
paid within five days or suit will be commenced. A copy
of the letter is sent to the person's employer. The man,
of course, could be perfectly innocent: The bank could
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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have made a mistake; however, the duress and coercion
upon that person would probably be such that he would
pay up and be quiet, hopeful that his employer would be
charitable in his attitude toward the matter. This would
be particularly so if when the man consulted counsel,
found out that the letter written about him even though
libelous per se and untrue was privileged.
We think it would be wrong for this Court to extend
the doctrine of privilege as far as it must be extended
to sustain the ruling of the Lower Court. In so stating,
we are mindful that this Court has cited with approval
the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Volume 3, Section
586, wherein it is stated:
"An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to
publish false and defamatory matter of another
in communications preliminary to a proposed
judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or
during the course and as part of the judicial
proceeding in which it participates as counsel, if
it has some relation thereto." Beezley v. Hansen,
supra.
We are unable to find any case law that supports the
proposition that a libel by an attorney is privileged if
made during the preparation for a lawsuit. If it be contended that a lawyer may publish a libel and escape the
consequences merely by mentioning that some possible
legal proceeding is contemplated, as is the case here, then
the law would have gone too far and the public policy that
it intended to serve would have been subverted.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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This is where our Court needs to define this matter
of privilege and strike a fair balance between the public
policy to be served and the rights of the individual who
is libeled. We suggest that the mere mention of a legal proceeding in a demand letter is insufficient to provide immunity. The threat of duress and coercion is all too apparent and it is believed that the privilege should not be
carried that far. The statement in the restatement giving
protection to counsel and clients who publish a libel in
connection with a proposed judicial proceeding should
either be expressly rejected by this Court or confined to
those situations where the communication is to another
attorney or a judicial or prosecuting officer. Publication
of the defamatory matter to those in no way connected
with the judicial proceeding should not be considered immune.
CONCLUSION
Defendants appeared in this action without answering the Complamt, but rather by filing a Motion for
Summary Judgment. The allegations of the Complaint
are therefore deemed admitted and the sole question before the Lower Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment was whether the defamatory letter was privileged.
The ruling of the Lower Court cannot be justified unless this Court were to hold:
1. That since litigation is pending between the
parties, the defamatory matter is privileged even though
it is not relevant to any issue in the pending lawsuit, or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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2. That the defamatory matter is privileged if in the
letter legal relief is mentioned if demands are not met.
It is the position of the plaintiffs in this action that
the bases of the Lower Court's Ruling are not sound and
that the Summary Judgment should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GARRETT
By EDWARD M. GARRETT
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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